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Abstract Although it has been intensively claimed that Islamic banks are subject to
more market discipline, the empirical literature is surprisingly mute on this topic. To fill this
gap and to verify the conjecture that Islamic bank depositors are indeed able to monitor and
discipline their banks, we use Turkey as a test setting. The theory of market discipline predicts
that when excessive risk taking occurs, depositors will ask higher returns on their deposits or
withdraw their funds. We look at the effect of the deposit insurance reform in which the dual
deposit insurance was revised and all banks were put under the same deposit insurance
company in December 2005. This gives us a natural experiment in which the effect of the
reform can be compared for the treatment group (i.e., Islamic banks) and control group (i.e.,
conventional banks). We find that the deposit insurance reform has increased the market
discipline in the Turkish Islamic banking sector. This reform may have upset the sensitivities of
the religiously inspired depositors, and perhaps more importantly it might have terminated the
existing mutual supervision and support among Islamic banks.
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1 Introduction
The motivation behind market discipline is to increase the role of depositors to supplement
regulatory discipline. The growing complexity of banking activities and the move towards
market-based banking provide an explanation for why subsequent Basel reforms have increas-
ingly stressed the role of market discipline as a pillar for a safe and efficient financial system.
Market discipline refers to a market-based incentive scheme, whereby depositors or other
creditors actively reward or punish banks for their relative performance. The underlying theory
of market discipline predicts that depositors will ask higher returns on their deposits and/or
withdraw their funds in response to declining bank fundamentals. This mechanism of market
discipline operates through both price and quantity adjustments in bank liabilities, which, in
turn, would force bank management to lessen its risk taking (Flannery 1998; Park and
Peristiani 1998; Martinez Peria and Schmukler 2001).
The existence of market discipline in conventional banking markets is well-documented and
reflected in the literature. Much of this evidence comes from countries with mature and well-
developed banking systems. Both price and quantity disciplining have been shown to play an
important role as a complement to supervisory efforts, particularly with respect to deposits that
are not fully insured. For example, using a sample of banks in thirty-two OECD countries, Nier
and Baumann (2006) find that riskier banks in general hold a bigger capital buffer, which
confirms the presence of market disciplining behavior in more mature institutional environ-
ments. Sironi (2003) yields a similar conclusion by analyzing the risk sensitivity of European
banks' subordinated notes and debentures spreads. For a sample of both OECD and developing
countries, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) find that depositors impose market discipline
on banks to a lesser extent when there is an explicit deposit insurance system.
The Islamic banking system distinguish itself from the conventional system because interest
(riba) is prohibited in Islam; i.e., banks are not permitted to charge predetermined interest rates
on loans or savings. In accordance with the Shariah, the Islamic legal rules, the Islamic
banking model is based on the profit-and-loss sharing mechanism (PLS), which is typically
practiced throughMudarabah (profit-sharing) andMusharaka (joint venture) contracts. Under
the PLS arrangement, bank assets and liabilities are balanced in such a way that borrowers
share profits and losses with banks, which then share these profits and losses with depositors.
Given the emphasis on equity financing, advocates of Islamic banking have argued that the
deleveraged nature of Islamic banks contribute to the stability of the financial system (Khan
and Mirakhor 1989; Ebrahim and Safadi 1995; Iqbal 1997). Čihák and Hesse (2010), Hasan
and Dridi (2011) and Beck et al. (2013), among others, provide empirical evidence that Islamic
banks better withstand negative shocks than conventional banks. Instead of debt, the Islamic
banking model introduces asset-backed financing instruments, where the investor’s return is
linked to the profit and loss of a pool of heterogeneous assets (Askari 2012). In addition,
Chapra (1992) and Mills and Presley (1999) argue that the risk-sharing feature of the PLS
paradigm allows Islamic banks to lend on longer-term basis to projects with better risk-return
profiles and, thus, promote economic growth.
More importantly for the purpose of our study, given the equity-like nature of savings and
investment deposits, it has been strongly claimed that Islamic banks are more subject to
market discipline (e.g., Errico and Farahbaksh 1998; El-Hawary et al. 2004; Beck et al.
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2013). In other words, as ‘quasi-shareholders’, Islamic bank depositors would have greater
incentives to exercise control over management to prevent excessive risk taking behavior. By
assessing the presence of market discipline, this article contributes to the small but growing
Islamic finance literature in several ways. To the best of our knowledge there has been no
empirical study examining the existence of market discipline in a dual banking system, where
Islamic and conventional banks operate side by side. Moreover, the existing literature does not
provide us clear insights into how the disciplining mechanism operates in the Islamic setting.
We attempt to fill this gap by examining depositors’ disciplining behavior in the Turkish
banking market. While in a few countries, such as Iran and Sudan, the entire banking industry
operates according to Islamic rules, in many other countries, such as Bangladesh, Egypt,
Malaysia and Turkey, Islamic financial institutions are running side-by-side with conventional
banks. The Turkish case provides an interesting opportunity to test the dynamics of depositors’
behavior. Turkey was the first country in the world that had adopted a dual deposit insurance
framework in 2001, in which the Islamic deposit insurance scheme operated alongside its
conventional counterpart. Unlike the conventional scheme, which was administered by the
government, the Islamic scheme was organized and managed by Islamic banks. However, on
December 2005, the dual deposit insurance framework was revised and the Islamic scheme
was absorbed by the conventional scheme. We exploit this natural experiment to study the
impact of the unified deposit insurance system on market discipline using a difference-in-
differences approach. By analyzing the Russian banking market, Karas et al. (2013) adopted a
similar empirical strategy in order to identify the differential effect of deposit insurance on the
behaviors of insured households and uninsured firms. We instead compare the presence of
market discipline among Islamic banks with a control group of conventional banks that are not
affected by the deposit insurance reform.
Our findings suggest that Islamic bank depositors indeed behave differently than their
conventional peers. In the pre-deposit insurance reform period, we observe that depositors of
conventional banks were sensitive to bank risk, whereas the vigilance of Islamic depositors
was not present. In the post-reform period, however, we find that Islamic bank depositors
increased their sensitivity to bank-specific risks. We interpret these findings as evidence that
the reform may have upset the sensitivities of religiously inspired depositors. Furthermore, the
reform may have terminated the mutual supervision and support among Islamic banks.
Robustness checks, in the form of incorporating the 2001 financial crisis in our analyses,
confirm that the presence of the Islamic deposit insurance scheme had a numbing effect on
market discipline.
We organize this article as follows. In Section 2, we describe the disciplining process in the
Islamic banking sector. Section 3 presents a concise history of the dual-banking industry in
Turkey. In Section 4, we describe the sample of banks, and identify the impact of the deposit
insurance reform on market discipline. Section 5 presents the results of the difference-in-
difference estimation strategy. Section 6 extends our sample period, look at the influence of the
2001 financial crisis on market discipline, and also functions as a robustness analysis. In
Section 7, we summarize our main findings and provide a discussion of the results found.
2 Market discipline in Islamic banks
Although the Islamic finance literature has highlighted the importance of market discipline,
still very little is known about the mechanism through which the disciplining occurs in a profit
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and loss sharing framework (Aysan et al. 2015). Particular focus in this context is on the
Mudaraba contract, which involves a partnership between the bank as one of the several
investors, with profits and losses being shared in mutually agreed proportions. This mode of
financing is manifested on the banks’ liabilities side, with investment accounts or deposits that
do not yield preset interest rates but rather confer a proportion of profits. An Islamic deposit
contract, in fact, contains neither debt nor equity-based compensations – and this, in turn, may
create additional agency conflicts. Agency problems do not only stem from the separation of
ownership and control for shareholders (Berle and Means 1932; Jensen and Meckling 1976;
Fama and Jensen 1983), but are also sourced from the separation of cash flow and control
rights for depositors (Safieddine 2009). Although in such an arrangement depositors turn from
bank creditors to residual claimants on banks’ cash flows, they are not granted the control
rights that shareholders enjoy and their cash flow rights are separated from the rights to control
the investments.
Recent corporate finance theories posit that corporate governance is increasingly based on
exit strategies rather than on voice. These theories conjecture that, in the absence of interven-
tion power, dispersed blockholders can govern firms (Edmans 2009; Admati and Pfleiderer
2009; and Edmans and Manso 2011). While such a dispersed structure appears to be a barrier
for direct intervention, it strengthens the role of a second governance mechanism: disciplining
through trading. This behavior involves an exit strategy upon negative information, thus
leading to a stock price that closely reflects the firm’s fundamental value. The drop in the
stock price involves the punishment of equity-linked managers, while ex-ante the mere threat
of exit raises efficiency as it induces managers to undertake value-enhancing activities.
The voice through exit mechanism is especially applicable to the Islamic model of banking.
According to this model, deposits are considered as shares (i.e., equity participation) and are
thus entitled to dividends if the investment operates at a profit (Bashir et al. 1993). Although
demand deposits are not tradable, they are highly liquid by their very nature. Deposits typically
contain a withdrawal option embedded with each account, which licenses the depositor to sell
the deposit to the bank at will. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) explain that, in a risk-sharing
framework, liquid deposits substantially help to align the bank’s portfolio choice with depos-
itors’ preferences. If the bank fundamentals turn out to be weak, depositors still could exercise
power over bank management due to their ability to withdraw their deposits when information
indicates poor firm prospects. Such an exit by depositors can be an effective governance
mechanism, even when they have no direct intervention power in the operation of the banks.
Although a profit-and-loss sharing framework may contribute to market discipline, the
influence of religious commitment on depositors’ sensitivity to bank financial conditions is
not unequivocal. On the one hand, the findings of prior research generally suggest that
religious individuals show more risk-averse characteristics than non-religious individuals.
For example, Miller and Hoffmann (1995) report a negative association at the individual
level between religiosity and attitudes towards risk. Similarly, Hilary and Hui (2009) show
that corporate policies of US firms located in more religious regions display lower
degrees of risk exposure. Extending this intuition to the market discipline mechanism,
we expect that Islamic bank depositors will be more vigilant and responsive to bank-
specific risks. On the other hand, Abedifar et al. (2013) point that Islamic depositors may
have a strong sense of loyalty toward their banks, thus numbing the sensitivity to bank
riskiness. This loyalty argument is likely to be more relevant in dual-banking systems
where Islamic banks are minor players in the market. In other words, in such banking
systems, religious reasons may play a strong role in the decision to bypass conventional
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banks and to deposit funds to Islamic banks. This conjecture has recently been evidenced
by Baele et al. (2014) with respect to the loan market in Pakistan. Their finding of much
lower default rates on Islamic loans than those on conventional loans suggests that the
signing of an Islamic loan contract activates religious moral norms.
In part because of the only recent institution of deposit insurance schemes for
Islamic banks, the literature is also silent regarding the impact of deposit coverage
on market discipline. Since the funds of the deposit insurance scheme may be
invested in interest-bearing assets, concerns are raised about its compliance with
Shariah principles (Solé 2007). In addition, because of the existence of different
modes of Islamic deposit insurance, clear-cut interpretations about the impact of
deposit insurance on market discipline are elusive. There are broadly two forms of
Islamic deposit insurance, protection of Islamic deposits through the conventional
insurance system or through the establishment of a separate Islamic deposit insur-
ance scheme. As for conventional banks, we expect that deposit insurance will affect
the incentives of Islamic depositors to exert market discipline.1 However, both
insurance forms can have different implications on the disciplining intensity. In
order to mitigate the lack of clarity in the insurability of profit-sharing deposit
accounts, a dual-deposit insurance framework may provide a clear signal to
Islamic depositors that the Islamic scheme is Shariah-compliant. Hence, the dual-
scheme may create confidence about Shariah-conformity of the reimbursed funds in
case of bankruptcy. Conversely, the conventional insurance scheme, that covers both
Islamic and conventional deposits, may face difficulties in convincing depositors
about the reliability of reimbursed funds when a bank failure occurs. Depending on
the intensity of religious devotion, even in the presence of blanket guarantee,
depositors still might discipline their Islamic bank under a conventional insurance
scheme.
3 Turkish dual-banking system and deposit insurance reform
Parallel to the growth in the Islamic finance industry worldwide, Islamic banks in
Turkey have also been expanding and attracting new customers. Interest-free banking
has long been present in Turkey and was first made legal in 1983, as part of a plan to
draw deposits from religious citizens and from the Gulf states, under the government
of Turgut Özal, a former prime minister and president of the Turkish Republic.
Islamic finance debuted in 1985 with the Bahrain-based AlBaraka Turk and the
Saudi-based Faisal Finans. The Kuwaiti-based Kuveyt Turk began its operations in
1989. Afterwards, the special finance houses also began lending with domestic capital,
1 The impact of deposit insurance on the disciplining behavior of conventional depositors is well-documented.
The existence of deposit insurance entails a trade-off between bank stability and moral hazard. Using cross-
country data, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) provide evidence that explicit deposit insurance signifi-
cantly increases the incidences of financial crisis. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga’s (2004) finding show that this
increase in financial fragility mainly stems from reduced depositors' incentives to monitor and discipline banks.
In developing countries, however, it is frequently observed that deposit insurance schemes are not fully credible.
Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) proved that depositors are also concerned about the solvency of the
insurance fund by showing that small-insured depositors still react to bank risk. Prean and Stix (2011) and Disli
et al. (2013) show that the credibility of generous deposit insurance schemes are especially affected in turbulent
economic environments.
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including Anadolu Finans in 1991, Ihlas Finans in 1995, and Asya Finans in 1996.2
These intermediaries introduced a different banking model into the system with
banning interest on deposits or loans. Instead, deposits were primarily invested into
transactions based upon principles of markups (Murabaha) and leasing services
(Ijhara). To distinguish the Islamic financial institutions from the conventional banks
operating in Turkey, they were given the status of ‘Special Finance Houses’. Despite
being Islamic-compliant, such a name was given with the objective to soften their
Islamic image and to resonate with the ideological sensibilities of the ruling admin-
istration. Initially, these institutions did not enjoy the same regulatory status as
conventional banks,3 the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) did not cover their
deposits, and they could not invest in government securities.
In the 1990s, otherwise known as the lost decade, the Turkish economy suffered severe
setbacks from large and volatile international capital flows. The first unpleasant experience
was due the 1991 Gulf War, which led to capital flow reversals and bank distress due to
Turkey's closeness to Iraq, and the first major banking collapse occurred in 1994.4 Although
the banking sector recovered quickly from the 1994 crisis, the economy in Turkey continued to
face significant headwinds. In 1999, to reduce fiscal and monetary imbalances, the Turkish
government launched an exchange rate-based stabilization (ERBS) program with the strong
support of the IMF. Massive capital inflows contributed to the bubble in the stock market, the
appreciation of the domestic currency, the widening of current account deficits, which in turn
led to an excessive expansion in domestic credit. However, interest rates began to rise because
of widening current account deficits and delays in the privatization program. With rates
moving up, levered banks were forced to offload their treasury holdings at sale prices to
maintain liquidity in the face of increasing financing costs.5 Taken together, all these factors
caused capital reversals, implying a sharp increase in the overnight interest rates. In December
2000, an IMF rescue package was needed to ease the tensions in the financial markets, and a
resemblance of stability was returned. However, the confidence in the disinflation program
was completely lost, and the economy teetered on the brink of collapse. The aftermath of the
2001 crisis witnessed a significant drop in the number of conventional banks from more than
50 to just 33.6
2 We refer to Aysan et al. (2013) for an overview of the developments in the Turkish Islamic banking sector.
3 Decree No. 83/7506, issued by the Council of Ministers, allowed Islamic banks to operate in Turkey. This
decree, however, could just as easily be revoked by the same authority (Brown 2014).
4 In order to contain budget deficits, the government introduced measures such as caps on Treasury bill rates, and
shifted towards deficit financing through monetization. The curbing of interest rates in the weekly tenders for
Treasury bills produced anxiety in financial markets and a loss of confidence in the government. The drop in
interest rates caused a decline in the profits from uncovered arbitrage opportunities and banks started to close
their open positions by buying foreign exchange in domestic markets. In order to contain the loss of foreign
currency reserves, and to defend the Turkish lira, the Central Bank was forced to heavily intervene in the
interbank market and raised the overnight rate to record levels. These developments undermined an already
fragile system, and the banking sector faced panic withdrawals of bank deposits. In order to restore confidence
and prevent further capital outflows, the government had to institute a blanket deposit guarantee.
5 The problem was compounded in October and early November with rumors of malpractices of some
nationalized banks. In October two more banks – Etibank and Bank Kapital – were brought under the
management of the Savings Deposit and Insurance Fund (SDIF). Moreover, not met privatization targets, due
to ideological differences within the ruling coalition, caused the IMF to postpone a scheduled fund transfer.
6 The fierce turmoil, between President Ahmet N. Sezer and Prime Minister Ecevit in February 2001, completely
agitated the financial markets. Because of the massive capital outflows, the overnight interest rates skyrocketed
on February 21 and the Central Bank had no choice but to abandon the peg. We refer to Akyüz and Boratav
(2003) for a detailed discussion about the development of the Turkish banking sector during the crisis.
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The financial crisis did not only affect conventional banks, but also the special finance
houses. Amid the mounting foreign exchange crisis, on 10 February 2001, Ihlas Finans’
license was revoked by the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) after
charges that it had siphoned off over $1 billion to its parent holding company (The
Economist 2001). Further, since Ihlas could not invest in government securities, it was exposed
to a severe maturity mismatch. With the outbreak of the liquidity crisis, Ihlas’ exposure led to
its collapse when it experienced a traditional bank run on its deposits. Since there was no
insurance to dissuade Islamic depositors from withdrawing their funds, it was feared that the
panic would spread to depositors at other Islamic financial institutions. The remaining Islamic
banks, however, proved to be resilient to the difficult operating environment. Another devel-
opment in the same period was the purchase of Faisal Finans by the Turkish holding company
Ülker, changing its name to Family Finans. Subsequently, in December 2005, Anadolu Finans
and Family Finans were merged into Türkiye Finans, leaving the number of Shariah-compli-
ant banks operating in Turkey to fall to four.7
The regulatory reform in Turkey actually started in June 1999 under Banks Act
4389. A new and independent regulatory authority, the BRSA, was established to
oversee banking system stability. However, due to political disputes, the
operationalization of the new agency was delayed until September 2000, when it
became a little too late to intervene appropriately.8 The 1999 bank law also brought
Islamic banks under the same regulatory umbrella as conventional banks. Although
the reform sought to integrate the Islamic banks into the financial system, these banks
were not made part of the conventional deposit insurance scheme but were merely
given the right to create one of their own (Brown 2014). Further, the implementation
of an Islamic deposit insurance scheme did not materialize until the collapse of Ihlas.
The Islamic deposit insurance scheme provided insurance up to 50,000 TL for each
deposit ownership in each bank, while the conventional insurance offered at that time
an unlimited coverage. Furthermore, unlike the conventional system, which was
managed by the government, the administration of the Islamic deposit insurance
system was delegated to the ‘Union of Private Finance Houses’. Membership to the
Union was compulsory for all licensed Islamic banks, and as the scheme was backed
by Islamic banks concerns about its Shariah-compliance were allayed. The operation
of the system was funded by premiums received from Islamic banks, and these were
assessed based on the amount of both demand and profit/loss participation accounts
(i.e., 0.25 % on the ending of quarterly balances9). This pioneering example was
praised because of its conformity to Takaful principles, the Islamic version of
7 In May 2015, Ziraat Participation Bank, was authorized by the country’s banking regulator (BRSA) to start its
operations as Turkey’s first state-owned Islamic bank, increasing the number of Islamic banks to five.
8 Although the institution of BRSAwas not successful in preventing the crisis at the end of 2000, it is considered
as the first of subsequent reforms in the regulation of the banking sector. In May 2001, the BRSA launched the
Banking Sector Restructuring Program (BSRP) to recover fundamental fragilities in the banking sector, and for
building a strong base for the system by clearing it from weak banks (see BRSA 2010).The structural reforms in
the banking industry and the political stability after 2002 have facilitated a significant improvement in overall
economic performance. In the period between 2002 and 2010, Turkey’s public sector debt-to-GDP ratio firmly
declined from 70 % to 42 %, a ratio that is since 2004 consistently below the Maastricht criterion. The conducive
economic environment in the period 2002-2007, with abundant global liquidity, also made Turkish treasury
instruments very attractive, and massive capital inflows steadily helped to reduce interest rates.
9 For purposes of completeness, Islamic banks with higher risk profiles could end-up paying 0.26 % on their end-
of-quarter deposit liabilities.
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insurance, where members cooperate to pool resources in order to guarantee each
other against loss or damage.
However, in December 2005, upon enactment of the Banking Act No. 5411, the dual
deposit insurance system was revised and the management of the Islamic deposit insurance
fund was transferred to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF). Following amendments to
the banking law, ‘Special Finance Institutions’ were renamed as ‘Participation Banks’, which
allowed them to integrate fully into the financial system. Premiums paid by Islamic banks to
the SDIF were equalized with those of conventional banks, and the premium ratio had initially
been calculated as of 0.15 % of the deposit amount covered under the deposit insurance
scheme (current and profit/loss participation accounts for Islamic banks and current and
savings accounts for conventional banks).10 The Law, however, did not require to separate
the premiums from conventional and Islamic banks, nor did it require the investment of
premiums into Shariah-compliant instruments (Brown 2014). Since the Islamic fund is not
separately managed anymore nor it is in accordance with the Shariah rules, serious concerns
have been raised in the properly resolution of failed Islamic institutions.
Participation banking in Turkey has not traditionally made up a large portion of
Turkey’s finance sector due to the secular tradition of the republic. However, by
becoming more and more like banks in both image and reality, they progressively
gained acceptance among depositors and investors. Also, after the 2001 crisis, the
ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) paved the way to the ascent of
Islamic finance. As illustrated in Table 1, slowly but surely, and especially after the
Banking Act of 2005, the sector has managed to increase its market share both on the
credits and deposits segments of the financial industry.
4 Data analysis and empirical strategy
We collect an unbalanced panel of 48 commercial banks operating in Turkey from the various
issues of Banks in Turkey published by the Banks Association of Turkey. This publication
includes quarterly balance sheet and income statement information from 2002:4 to 2012:4. The
fourth quarter of 2002 corresponds to the effective start of the Erdogan-era. Of the 48
conventional banks, 23 banks are branches of foreign banks or are classified as foreign
subsidiaries (more than 50 % of their shares are owned by non-residents), 22 banks are
domestically owned commercial banks (more than 50 % of their shares are owned by
Turkish residents), and 3 are classified as state-owned deposit-taking banks (predominantly
owned by the Turkish government). The Islamic bank data contains an unbalanced panel of 6
banks and is obtained from the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.11
As with most similar studies, we analyze both the price and quantity reactions to bank risk
since this joint information allows us to better identify disciplining behavior. The use of this
combined information will help us to disentangle depositor discipline from demand shifts (e.g.,
Ioannidou and de Dreu 2006; Karas et al. 2013). A positive relation between bank risk and
10 From 2009 onward, the SDIF has implemented for both banking models a more risk weighted deposit
insurance premiums with a premium ratio varying between 0.11 % and 0.19 %. The maximum deposit insurance
coverage for both Islamic and conventional bank deposits was set at 50,000 TL, but was in February 2013
doubled to 100,000 TL.
11 For both Islamic as well as conventional banks, these figures includes adjustments for mergers & acquisitions
by generating a new bank after tracing such an event.
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deposit rates could reflect a demand effect rather than discipline, with risky banks pursuing a
more aggressive expansion strategy to meet new loan demand. But this would be discovered
by looking at the quantity regression, where the relation between bank risk and deposit
quantity would also be positive in case of a demand effect, and negative in case of true
depositor discipline.
So far, most published studies have analyzed the differences in behavior to bank risk between
insured and uninsured deposits and have ascribed behavioral differences to the presence of
insurance. In their approach, however, it cannot be dismissed that other depositor group-
specific characteristics may possibly explain the observed differences as well. Other studies
provide empirical evidence on the incentive impact of deposit insurance by comparing the
behavior of a particular depositor group by looking at the before and after deposit insurance
introduction. But their approach cannot reject the possibility that the results are driven by other
time specific unobservable characteristics. The difference-in-differences approach allows us to
study the effect of treatment, in this case the unification of the dual deposit insurance system, by
comparing the depositor sensitivity to risk of the treatment group (i.e., Islamic banks) pre- and
post-treatment relative to the depositor sensitivity to risk of the control group (i.e., conventional
banks) pre- and post-treatment. By comparing changes, we control for time-invariant character-
istics that might affect Islamic and conventional bank depositors differently and for time-varying
factors that might affect them in a similar fashion.
Our identification strategy is the most related to Karas et al. (2013). They employ a similar
difference-in-differences methodology to identify the differential impact of deposit insurance on
the behavior of insured households and uninsured firms and find evidence that insurance
diminishes the insured depositors’ sensitivity to bank risk.
We employ the following reduced-form difference-in-differences models:
DEPGi; j; t ¼ αi þ α j;t þ α1*Xi;t − 1 þ α2*Xi;t−1*ISLþ α3*Xi;t−1*REFþ α4*Xi;t−1*ISL*REFþ α5*Ci;t þ εi; j;t
ð1Þ
RDEPi; j;t ¼ βi þ β j;t þ β1*Xi;t−1 þ β2*Xi;t−1*ISLþ β3*Xi;t−1*REFþ β4*Xi;t−1*ISL*REFþ β5*Ci;t þ μi; j;t
ð2Þ
Where ISL= 1 for Islamic banks and ISL= 0 for conventional banks. The variable
REF is a dichotomous variable for the post-treatment period, i.e., after the unification
of the insurance system in 2005Q4. From the perspective of depositors, we can fairly
claim that the deposit insurance reform constitutes an exogenous change and its
impact only applies to Islamic banks but not to conventional banks. The reaction
variables are the traditional measures used in the depositor discipline literature. The
dependent variable in Eq. 1 is the first difference of the log of deposits of bank type j
(Islamic or conventional) for bank i during period t, and the dependent variable in
Eq. 2 is the quarterly expenses for bank deposits divided by total deposits of type j
for bank i during period t. For both Islamic and conventional banks, according to the
market discipline hypothesis, the return on deposits should in principle be a reflection
of the risk profile.
The Xi,t − 1 represents a matrix of bank fundamentals that might be of interest to
depositors concerned about bank safety. This vector contains capitalization, our pri-
mary indicator of bank-level risk, bank liquidity, and non-performing loans. These
variables are included with a one-quarter lag to account for the delay in publication.
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The CAP variable is measured as the capital-to-assets ratio. The LIQ and NPL
variables are calculated as liquid assets to total assets, and the ratio non-performing
loans to assets, respectively. Although we focus on the sensitivity of depositors to
bank capitalization, we estimate the most flexible specification by integrating each of
these fundamentals directly (coefficient α1 in Eq. 1/ β1 in Eq. 2) as well as with three
separate interaction terms (coefficients α2, α3 and α4 in Eq. 1/ β2, β3, and β4 in Eq.2)
in each difference-in-differences specification (Eq. 1 or Eq. 2).
Our primary measure of a bank’s risk level is its capital-to-assets ratio. Following
the introduction of the 1988 Basel Accord and the 1996 Market Risk Amendment, the
importance of bank capital buffers to financial safety has been emphasized and capital
management has become the main channel through which banks manage their risk of
insolvency (Nier and Baumann 2006). Further, more than any other measure, the
capital ratio is extensively used as a proxy for bank risk taking in market discipline
studies, in both developed and emerging market economies (e.g., Hannan and
Hanweck 1988; Park and Peristiani 1998; Martinez Peria and Schmukler 2001;
Karas et al. 2013; Disli et al. 2013; Berger and Turk-Ariss 2014). We also refer to
Disli and Schoors (2013) and Disli et al. (2013) who found that only bank capital
proved to be unambiguously leading to depositor discipline in the Turkish conven-
tional banking market. From the perspective of depositors, this simple but powerful
indicator mitigates information asymmetries since a bank’s decision to hold more
capital subject its owners to a greater loss in case of failure. As holding capital
encourages banks to undertake less risk, depositors will reward these banks by
supplying more funds at lower deposit rates.
Evidence of depositor discipline requires α1 >0 and β1 <0 with increased bank capitaliza-
tion for conventional banks in the pre-treatment period. The slope parameters α2 and β2 seize
the difference in means between Islamic and conventional banks before the treatment takes
place. If the signs of α2 and β2 are similar to the signs of α1 and β1, respectively, Islamic
depositors are more vigilant to bank risk than their conventional counterparts. If on the other
hand, α2 and β2 have opposite signs to that of α1 and β1, respectively, Islamic depositors are
not as much sensitive to bank risk as conventional depositors. The parameters α3 and β3
capture for the conventional banking market the change in depositor sensitivity in the unified
deposit insurance period. The coefficients α4 and β4 quantify the additional shift in the
sensitivity of Islamic depositors after the treatment.
The Ci,t contains other bank specific controls potentially affecting the reaction
variables. The Bank size variable is calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets.
As a measure for institutional maturity, we define Bank age as the natural logarithm
of quarter-years. The variable Branch size is the average number of employees per
branch and is used as a metric of bank service quality. Since listed banks expose
themselves more to public scrutiny, we also control for this and use a dummy variable
which equals to 1 when banks are listed in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (Borsa
Istanbul).
We estimate a model using bank-fixed effects, αi, for the quantity reaction, and βi,
for the return reaction to control for unobserved characteristics across banks.
Furthermore, in all specifications, we include quarter dummy variables per bank type
j (Islamic or conventional) to account for nation-wide shocks that may have a
different effect on the two types of depositors (i.e., αj,t in the deposit growth equation
and βj,t in the price equation).
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Table 2 provides summary statistics on variables used in this analysis. The table
compares the treatment group of Islamic banks to the control group of conventional
banks for the period before as well as after the deposit insurance reform. Although
the difference diminished in time, we ascertain that Islamic banks were able to attract
more deposits than their conventional counterparts. Interestingly, they were able to do
so even though they offered lower returns on deposits. In both periods, Turkish
Islamic banks exhibit poor fundamentals vis-à-vis their conventional peers in terms
of bank capitalization (CAP) and liquidity positions (LIQ). It seems, however, that
Islamic banks achieved better loan quality (NPL) than conventional banks.
Conventional banks have on average more personnel per branch than Islamic banks
for both periods. Finally, after the reform, two Islamic banks have been listed on the
Istanbul Stock Exchange, while there were no listed Islamic banks in the period
before.
5 Empirical results
Table 3 presents the results from the difference-in-differences estimations. Columns
(1-4) exhibit the estimation results of Eq. 1; columns (5-8) refer to the estimation
results of Eq. 2. To test whether our results are sensitive to alternative sample
compositions, for each equation we produce four sets of estimates. Columns (1) and
(5) report the results for all banks with different ownership types. In columns (2) and
Table 2 Summary statistics. The table reports summary statistics of bank-specific variables with each observa-
tion representing a measure for a single bank in a specific quarter. The DEPG is calculated as the first difference
of the log of deposits. The RDEP represents the implicit returns on deposits, calculated as the quarterly deposit
expenses divided by total bank deposits. The bank fundamentals are represented by CAP, NPL and LIQ. The
CAP is the book value of equity to total assets. The LIQ is equal to liquid assets (cash and central bank reserves)
to total assets. The NPL is ratio of loans under follow-up to total credits. The control-vector contains Bank size,
Bank age, Branch size and Listed. The Bank size variable is computed as the natural logarithm of total assets. The
Bank age variable is the natural logarithm of quarter-years the bank exists. The Branch size variable is the
average number of employees per branch . The Listed variable equals to 1 when banks are listed in the Istanbul
Stock Exchange (Borsa Istanbul)
2002Q4-2005Q3 2005Q4-2012Q4
Conventional Banks Islamic Banks Conventional Banks Islamic Banks
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
DEPG 0.026 0.385 0.085 0.075 0.052 0.392 0.064 0.050
RDEP 0.030 0.073 0.021 0.005 0.023 0.145 0.017 0.006
CAP 0.188 0.146 0.114 0.029 0.193 0.180 0.119 0.021
NPL 0.127 0.222 0.108 0.063 0.061 0.155 0.041 0.015
LIQ 0.235 0.217 0.145 0.061 0.202 0.211 0.209 0.090
Bank size 14.119 2.135 13.936 0.399 15.283 2.234 15.747 0.615
Bank age 4.662 0.786 4.007 0.366 4.890 0.645 4.354 0.301
Branch size 29.595 21.875 18.338 3.504 27.945 20.152 20.562 2.912
Listed 0.299 0.458 0.000 0.000 0.399 0.490 0.422 0.496
268 J Financ Serv Res (2017) 51:257–282
T
ab
le
3
Te
st
s
fo
r
m
ar
ke
td
is
ci
pl
in
e,
sa
m
pl
e
pe
ri
od
20
02
Q
4-
20
12
Q
4.
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
es
tim
at
es
in
th
e
tim
e
di
m
en
si
on
co
ve
ri
ng
th
e
pe
ri
od
20
02
Q
4-
20
12
Q
4.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
in
C
ol
um
ns
(1
-4
)
is
D
E
PG
,w
hi
ch
is
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
as
th
e
fi
rs
t
di
ff
er
en
ce
of
th
e
lo
g
of
de
po
si
ts
.T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
in
C
ol
um
ns
(5
-8
)
is
R
D
E
P,
w
hi
ch
is
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
as
th
e
qu
ar
te
rl
y
de
po
si
te
xp
en
se
s
di
vi
de
d
by
to
ta
lb
an
k
de
po
si
ts
.T
he
ba
nk
fu
nd
am
en
ta
ls
ar
e
re
pr
es
en
te
d
by
C
A
P,
N
PL
,a
nd
L
IQ
.T
he
C
A
P
is
th
e
bo
ok
va
lu
e
of
eq
ui
ty
to
to
ta
la
ss
et
s.
T
he
L
IQ
is
eq
ua
lt
o
liq
ui
d
as
se
ts
(c
as
h
an
d
ce
nt
ra
lb
an
k
re
se
rv
es
)t
o
to
ta
la
ss
et
s.
T
he
N
PL
is
ra
tio
of
lo
an
s
un
de
rf
ol
lo
w
-u
p
to
to
ta
lc
re
di
ts
.I
SL
is
eq
ua
lt
o
1
fo
r
Is
la
m
ic
ba
nk
s,
an
d
0
ot
he
rw
is
e.
R
E
F
is
eq
ua
l
to
1
fo
r
th
e
po
st
-r
ef
or
m
pe
ri
od
(2
00
5Q
4-
20
12
Q
4)
,a
nd
0
ot
he
rw
is
e.
T
he
co
nt
ro
l-
ve
ct
or
co
nt
ai
ns
B
an
k
si
ze
,B
an
k
ag
e,
B
ra
nc
h
si
ze
an
d
Li
st
ed
.T
he
B
an
k
si
ze
va
ri
ab
le
is
co
m
pu
te
d
as
th
e
na
tu
ra
ll
og
ar
ith
m
of
to
ta
la
ss
et
s.
T
he
B
an
k
ag
e
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
na
tu
ra
ll
og
ar
ith
m
of
qu
ar
te
r-
ye
ar
s
th
e
ba
nk
ex
is
ts
.T
he
B
ra
nc
h
si
ze
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
av
er
ag
e
nu
m
be
ro
fe
m
pl
oy
ee
s
pe
rb
ra
nc
h
T
he
Li
st
ed
va
ri
ab
le
eq
ua
ls
to
1
w
he
n
ba
nk
s
ar
e
lis
te
d
in
th
e
Is
ta
nb
ul
St
oc
k
E
xc
ha
ng
e
(B
or
sa
Is
ta
nb
ul
).
B
an
k-
ty
pe
(I
sl
am
ic
or
co
nv
en
tio
na
l)
qu
ar
te
r-
ye
ar
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
in
cl
ud
ed
in
al
l
sp
ec
if
ic
at
io
ns
bu
t
th
ei
r
co
ef
fi
ci
en
t
es
tim
at
es
ar
e
no
t
re
po
rt
ed
.
T
he
re
gr
es
si
on
m
et
ho
d
is
fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
es
tim
at
or
w
ith
he
te
ro
sk
ed
as
tic
ity
an
d
w
ith
in
-p
an
el
se
ri
al
co
rr
el
at
io
n
ro
bu
st
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
.S
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
D
ep
os
it
gr
ow
th
(E
q.
1)
D
ep
os
it
ra
te
(E
q.
2)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
C
ap
ita
l
ra
tio
C
A
P
1.
09
62
0*
**
1.
11
06
5*
**
1.
38
75
5*
**
1.
05
16
2*
**
−0
.0
20
74
**
*
−0
.0
20
13
**
*
−0
.0
18
06
*
−0
.0
08
67
(0
.2
97
9)
(0
.2
99
8)
(0
.4
00
9)
(0
.3
34
5)
(0
.0
06
6)
(0
.0
06
7)
(0
.0
09
2)
(0
.0
11
4)
C
A
P
x
IS
L
−1
.0
44
93
*
−1
.0
77
47
*
−1
.5
73
17
**
−0
.9
42
00
0.
03
77
9*
0.
03
85
7*
0.
03
22
2
0.
02
54
4
(0
.6
18
7)
(0
.6
30
6)
(0
.7
44
8)
(0
.7
07
8)
(0
.0
19
1)
(0
.0
19
7)
(0
.0
22
4)
(0
.0
22
1)
C
A
P
x
R
E
F
−0
.4
88
08
**
−0
.4
85
16
**
−0
.7
44
40
**
−0
.2
79
20
0.
02
68
5*
**
0.
02
50
6*
**
0.
01
93
4*
0.
01
36
5
(0
.1
91
6)
(0
.1
92
2)
(0
.2
73
5)
(0
.3
80
4)
(0
.0
06
9)
(0
.0
07
3)
(0
.0
10
1)
(0
.0
17
3)
C
A
P
x
IS
L
x
R
E
F
1.
19
09
1*
*
1.
20
18
5*
*
1.
54
66
5*
*
0.
85
88
6
−0
.0
51
20
**
−0
.0
51
57
**
−0
.0
45
86
*
−0
.0
38
97
(0
.5
13
5)
(0
.5
19
2)
(0
.6
25
9)
(0
.6
93
5)
(0
.0
19
8)
(0
.0
19
1)
(0
.0
23
1)
(0
.0
25
3)
O
th
er
fu
nd
am
en
ta
ls
N
PL
−0
.0
00
31
**
*
−0
.0
00
32
**
*
0.
05
77
6
−0
.0
00
26
**
*
−0
.0
00
01
**
*
−0
.0
00
01
**
*
−0
.0
00
60
−0
.0
00
01
**
*
(0
.0
00
1)
(0
.0
00
1)
(0
.0
95
8)
(0
.0
00
1)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
01
9)
(0
.0
00
0)
N
PL
x
IS
L
−0
.8
84
66
**
*
−0
.9
04
06
**
*
−1
.4
21
86
**
*
−0
.8
52
13
**
0.
02
54
3*
*
0.
02
41
7*
*
0.
01
45
9
0.
01
77
7
(0
.3
18
9)
(0
.2
91
4)
(0
.4
66
8)
(0
.3
57
0)
(0
.0
10
2)
(0
.0
08
9)
(0
.0
12
5)
(0
.0
12
1)
N
PL
x
R
E
F
0.
06
92
2*
*
0.
07
02
3*
*
0.
04
01
1
0.
31
17
0
−0
.0
02
92
**
*
−0
.0
02
81
**
*
−0
.0
01
95
−0
.0
08
48
(0
.0
31
1)
(0
.0
32
6)
(0
.1
16
8)
(0
.3
93
7)
(0
.0
00
9)
(0
.0
00
9)
(0
.0
02
3)
(0
.0
11
5)
N
PL
x
IS
L
x
R
E
F
0.
58
08
2
0.
59
08
9
0.
54
58
5
0.
08
48
5
0.
04
86
0
0.
04
44
0
0.
03
53
7
0.
05
18
8
J Financ Serv Res (2017) 51:257–282 269
T
ab
le
3
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
D
ep
os
it
gr
ow
th
(E
q.
1)
D
ep
os
it
ra
te
(E
q.
2)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
(0
.5
57
8)
(0
.5
86
2)
(0
.8
08
8)
(0
.7
67
1)
(0
.0
31
1)
(0
.0
29
7)
(0
.0
28
1)
(0
.0
32
0)
L
IQ
−0
.2
35
32
*
−0
.2
30
19
−0
.1
51
77
−0
.2
85
66
**
0.
00
40
4
0.
00
42
4
0.
00
50
0
−0
.0
00
15
(0
.1
39
9)
(0
.1
40
3)
0.
20
53
)
(0
.1
13
3)
(0
.0
06
1)
(0
.0
06
1)
(0
.0
04
2)
(0
.0
09
0)
L
IQ
x
IS
L
0.
45
95
5*
*
0.
47
52
3*
*
0.
44
86
5*
0.
45
23
4
0.
01
39
3
0.
00
82
8
0.
00
07
5
0.
01
16
3
(0
.2
09
6)
(0
.1
98
3)
(0
.2
62
5)
(0
.3
32
5)
(0
.0
09
9)
(0
.0
11
0)
(0
.0
12
1)
(0
.0
14
7)
L
IQ
x
R
E
F
0.
02
48
0
0.
02
66
0
−0
.1
06
79
0.
09
74
6
0.
00
23
5
0.
00
17
1
0.
00
08
2
−0
.0
13
94
**
*
(0
.0
87
3)
(0
.0
88
2)
(0
.1
53
0)
(0
.0
87
9)
(0
.0
05
9)
(0
.0
06
0)
(0
.0
03
4)
(0
.0
04
4)
L
IQ
x
IS
L
x
R
E
F
−0
.3
13
50
−0
.3
31
67
−0
.2
95
45
−0
.3
33
74
−0
.0
06
45
−0
.0
02
14
0.
00
31
3
0.
01
27
7
(0
.2
81
9)
v(
0.
28
24
)
(0
.3
25
0)
(0
.3
73
9)
(0
.0
09
6)
(0
.0
10
3)
(0
.0
10
9)
(0
.0
11
6)
B
an
k
co
nt
ro
ls
B
an
k
si
ze
0.
19
98
9*
*
0.
20
16
7*
*
0.
23
78
4*
*
0.
14
64
5
−0
.0
00
29
−0
.0
00
40
−0
.0
00
96
0.
00
13
5
(0
.0
78
5)
(0
.0
80
0)
(0
.1
01
3)
(0
.0
95
8)
(0
.0
01
1)
(0
.0
01
1)
(0
.0
00
7)
(0
.0
02
3)
B
an
k
ag
e
−0
.0
25
56
−0
.0
02
66
0.
15
51
1
−0
.0
40
21
0.
00
94
3*
**
0.
00
56
7
0.
00
62
4
0.
00
44
4
(0
.0
80
1)
(0
.0
93
1)
(0
.2
54
2)
(0
.0
59
0)
(0
.0
03
4)
(0
.0
03
5)
(0
.0
05
9)
(0
.0
03
3)
B
ra
nc
h
si
ze
−0
.0
02
15
−0
.0
02
23
−0
.0
02
63
*
0.
00
39
7
0.
00
00
1
0.
00
00
1
0.
00
00
3
−0
.0
00
10
(0
.0
01
4)
(0
.0
01
4)
(0
.0
01
3)
(0
.0
03
6)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
1)
L
is
te
d
−0
.0
25
10
−0
.0
28
02
0.
01
27
3
−0
.0
10
88
−0
.0
06
44
**
*
−0
.0
05
00
**
*
−0
.0
02
42
**
−0
.0
03
98
**
*
(0
.0
37
8)
(0
.0
29
7)
(0
.0
34
0)
(0
.0
26
9)
(0
.0
01
5)
(0
.0
01
7)
(0
.0
01
0)
(0
.0
01
3)
St
at
e-
ow
ne
d
ba
nk
s
Y
es
--
--
-
--
--
-
--
--
-
Y
es
--
--
-
--
--
-
--
--
-
Pr
iv
at
e-
ow
ne
d
ba
nk
s
Y
es
Y
es
--
--
-
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
--
--
-
Y
es
Fo
re
ig
n-
ow
ne
d
ba
nk
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
--
--
-
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
--
--
-
Is
la
m
ic
ba
nk
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
B
an
k-
fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
270 J Financ Serv Res (2017) 51:257–282
T
ab
le
3
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
D
ep
os
it
gr
ow
th
(E
q.
1)
D
ep
os
it
ra
te
(E
q.
2)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
T
im
e-
fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
1,
36
6
1,
24
6
72
5
68
3
1,
32
4
1,
21
2
70
7
66
7
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
10
53
0.
11
10
0.
15
83
0.
34
32
0.
52
85
0.
47
23
0.
33
51
0.
79
37
St
at
is
tic
al
si
gn
if
ic
an
ce
is
in
di
ca
te
d
by
**
*
p
<
0.
01
,*
*
p
<
0.
05
,*
p
<
0.
1
J Financ Serv Res (2017) 51:257–282 271
(6) we exclude state-owned banks since they provide depositors weaker incentives for
monitoring and disciplining (Caprio and Honohan 2004). Columns (3) and (7) restrict
the sample to foreign-owned banks as a control group, while in columns (4) and (8)
compare the behavior of Islamic depositors to that of their privately-owned peers.
Prior to the unified deposit insurance implementation, in general we observe that
depositors of conventional banks were sensitive to bank capitalization (CAP). An
increase in the capital ratio is associated with higher deposit growth (α1 > 0 and
statistically significant for different sample selections) and lower deposit rates (β1 < 0
and statistically significant for different sample selections except for column 8), which
provides direct evidence of depositor discipline.12 As to whether Islamic depositors
were more or less sensitive to bank capitalization than conventional depositors prior to
the deposit insurance reform (see the coefficient estimate of CAP x ISL), the evidence
suggests that quantity sensitivity to capitalization was annihilated (i.e., α1 + α2). The
parameter estimates of α3 and β3 reveal the change in depositor sensitivity in the
unified deposit insurance scheme period for conventional banks (coefficient estimate
of CAP x REF).
In what follows, given our primary focus, we concentrate on the main coefficients
of interest (α4 and β4). In the quantity equation, through different samplings (except
in columns 4 and 8), we observe that the difference-and-differences coefficient (α4) is
consistently positive and highly significant. We also find that β4 in general enters the
deposit rate equation with negative coefficients. These findings suggest that in general
the sensitivity of Islamic bank depositors, relative to conventional depositors, have
increased substantially after the reform. Alternatively, we might describe the coeffi-
cients α3 and β3 as capturing the commonly felt impact of depositor insurance reform
on depositor vigilance, whereas the difference-in-difference coefficients seize the
differential impact on the vigilance of Islamic depositors. In sum, our results reveal
that, in the pre-reform period, conventional bank depositors were more sensitive to
bank capitalization as predicted by the market discipline theory: banks with lower
capital ratios attracted fewer deposits while they paid higher risk premiums. On the
other hand, Islamic banks were in the same period not disciplined at all. The deposit
insurance reform, however, consistently produced more sensitive Islamic depositors to
bank risk.13
Confirming the importance of the capital ratio, other bank fundamentals (NPL and
LIQ), and their interactions with ISL and/or REF, do not allow us to draw clear
conclusions concerning their influence on market discipline.14 Turning to our control
variables, larger banks (Bank size) do benefit from too-big-to fail effects as they on
12 Conversely, depositors will punish banks with a lower capital ratio by decreasing the supply of funds, i.e.,
raising the average yield on deposits and reducing the quantity of deposits.
13 The estimation results for the sample composition of private and Islamic banks, columns 4 and 8 of Table 3,
reveal that while the signs of the estimated coefficients for the capital ratio and for its interactions are similar to
those of alternative sample compositions, most of them are not statistically significant.
14 Although conventional banks with high performing loans (NPL) face deposit withdrawals, it also appears to
decrease the interest rate that depositors demand from these banks. A similar finding was observed in the
Columbian banking sector (Barajas and Steiner 2000). In the post-reform period, our findings indicate that the
conventional deposit growth sensitivity to NPL has been reversed. On the other hand, albeit heavily reduced in
the post-reform period, Islamic depositors were sensitive to non-performing loans in the manner predicted by the
market discipline hypothesis. The effect of liquidity (LIQ) on the reaction of depositors, Islamic as well as
conventional, is not consistent with the market discipline hypothesis.
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average succeed in attracting more deposits while they do not pay higher returns on
deposits. We do not find evidence that older banks (Bank age) produce advantage in
terms of deposits and interest rates compared to their younger counterparts. Further,
bank service quality (Branch size) does not seem to influence deposit flows nor the
expenses on deposits, while the deposit expenses of listed banks (Listed) were on
average lower.
6 Banking crisis, dual deposit insurance and market discipline
6.1 Before and after the 2001Q1 crisis
Turkey's relatively large and historically troubled conventional banking sector had been
covered by deposit insurance since 1983; as we have noted, combined with problems of
insider lending, weak monitoring and control mechanism, provision of implicit and explicit
government guarantees had left the banking sector in a particularly vulnerable position.
Although Islamic banks were not much affected by the 1994 financial crisis, the 2001 crisis
shook also this segment of the industry. In the wake of the 2001 banking crisis, Ihlas Finans,
the then largest finance house, faced a run on its deposits. In February 2001, the BRSA
revoked the operating license of Ihlas Finans on the grounds that it failed to fulfill its liabilities.
However, unlike the conventional deposits, the deposits of Islamic banks did not enjoy
insurance coverage with the rationale that profit-and-loss accounts involved no guarantee of
return (Starr and Yilmaz 2007).15 In a way, the actual creation of the Islamic deposit insurance
scheme right after the collapse of Ihlas provides us a second natural experiment: both banking
models were affected by the crisis with the difference being that conventional banks enjoyed
deposit insurance, whereas Islamic banks only did so right after the collapse of Ihlas.
We first estimate the sensitivity of deposit flows to bank financial conditions, allowing for
different sensitivities across the two banking models and two distinct periods: before and after
the 2001Q1 crisis. Since expenses on Islamic deposit accounts were not available before 2002,
we cannot estimate the equivalent price equation. Specifically, we estimate the following panel
specification:
DEPGi; j; t ¼ αi þ α j;t þ α1*Xi;t−1 þ α2*Xi;t−1*ISLþ α3*Xi;t−1*CRIS
þ α4*Xi;t−1*ISL*CRISþ α5*Ci;t þ εi; j;t ð3Þ
As in Eq. 1, the dependent variable is the first difference of the log of deposits of bank type j
for bank i during period t. The right-hand side variables are the same as in Section 4.2., with
the exception that the deposit insurance reform dummy variable (REF) is now
replaced by the financial crisis (CRIS) dummy variable. The financial crisis dummy
variable takes the value of 1 for the period after the collapse of the banking sector
(2001Q1 and thereafter), and 0 otherwise. The coefficient α1 capture the sensitivity of
deposit growth to bank capitalization for conventional banks before the financial
crisis. The slope parameter α2 represents the difference in means between Islamic
15 The liquidation process of Ihlas would drag on and, as of today, has still not been settled in full. Profit and loss
sharing participation accounts were fourth in line for repayment after debts owed to the government, personnel
payments and current account debts. On December 31, 2013, 20,780 depositors were still waiting to be serviced.
Further details about the payout schedule can be found at http://www.ifk.com.tr/ (last visited on May 25, 2015).
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and conventional banks before the crisis. The coefficient α3 seize the effect of a
macroeconomic shock – that is, the banking crisis – on the vigilance of conventional
(wholly) and Islamic depositors (partly, in conjunction with α4). The coefficient α4
(the difference-in-differences coefficient) captures the differential effect of Islamic
deposit insurance on the vigilance of Islamic depositors.
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis occurred concurrently with the introduc-
tion of the Islamic deposit insurance scheme, we are not able to disentangle their
potential opposing effects on market discipline. However, it might be possible that in
the immediate aftermath of the crisis, the wake-up call effects might transcend the
numbing effect of the newly instituted deposit insurance scheme. Therefore, we
estimate the model for two sample periods: 1998Q1-2002Q3 (the period before AK
Party came into power) and 1998Q1-2005Q3 (the period before the unification of
deposit insurance schemes).
Table 4 reports the estimation results of Eq. (3). Columns (1)-(4) present the results
for the 1998Q1-2005Q3 sample period, whereas Columns (5)-(8) display the results
for the shorter sample period (1998Q1-2002Q3). We estimate the most flexible
specification with capital (CAP), loan quality (NPL), and liquidity (LIQ) and full set
of interactions. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results, however, we only
report the coefficient estimates of CAP and its interactions with ISL and/or CRIS
since the other fundamental variables do not allow us to draw meaningful conclusions
concerning their influence on market discipline.16 As in Table 3, each column in both
panels reflect the estimation results for alternative sample compositions. Our results in
general indicate that, prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis, conventional (α1 > 0)
as well as Islamic (α1 +α2 > 0) depositors were sensitive to bank capitalization. Even
though the conventional depositors were backed by a deposit insurance fund, they
continued to impose market discipline on their banks. This finding is in line with the
results of Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) who reported that even insured
depositors may respond to bank risk if they are concerned about the insurance fund
solvency, or that depositors still feared costs related to the recovery of deposits in
case of failure (i.e. costs due to late payments and the foregone interest earnings).
Likewise, for a sample of banks in CEEC countries, the recent study of Hasan et al.
(2013) found that global financial crisis did not alter the sensitivity of capital flows to
bank risk.17
Before the crisis, although somewhat weakened when considering the shorter
sample period, Islamic depositors behaved in accordance to the market discipline
hypothesis. More importantly, in the post-crisis period, with the introduction of an
Islamic deposit insurance scheme, and independent of the examined sample period,
the capital ratio lost its indicative power to discipline Islamic banks.18 Our findings
indicate that the wake-up call effect of Ihlas’ failure on Islamic depositors was
16 Full results are available upon request. Disli et al. (2013) and Karas et al. (2013) employed a similar projection
of their results in their analyses of market discipline in the Turkish and Russian banking sector, respectively.
17 Fueda and Konishi (2007) show that depositor sensitivity in Japan was most significant in the period 1997-
2001 despite the presence of a blanket guarantee. Likewise Forssbæck (2011), who analyzed several hundred
banks worldwide over the period 1995-2005, could not find evidence of increased depositor sensitivity during
financial crises.
18 A notable exception is the sample composition of foreign and Islamic banks (columns 3 and 7 of Table 4):
although the sign of the coefficient of CAP x ISL x CRIS is similar to those of other sample compositions, it is
not statistically significant.
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substantially muted with the creation of an Islamic deposit insurance scheme.19
Furthermore, at the onset of the failure of Ihlas, Starr and Yilmaz (2007) show that
the deposit levels of a competing Islamic bank quickly recovered after an initial
decline. Rather than raising doubts about the Islamic banking conduct, it appears that
Islamic depositors perceived the Ihlas case as an isolated event.20 This finding
confirms our previous observation that market discipline was not present in the
Islamic banking segment before the unification of deposit insurance schemes, i.e., in
the period where the Islamic deposit insurance scheme was instituted.
6.2 Full sample period
In this section, by making use of the full sample period, we integrate the two
previous analyses into one. Specifically, we estimate the sensitivity of deposit growth
to bank risk factors by looking at the differences in sensitivities across the two
depositor groups and three distinct periods: before the 2001Q1 crisis, the 2001Q1
(outbreak of the crisis) and 2005Q3 (before deposit insurance reform) period and the
post-reform period. For this purpose, we estimate the following regression model:
DEPGi; j;t ¼ αi þ α j;t þ α1*Xi;t−1 þ α2*Xi;t−1*P2þ α3*Xi;t−1*P3þ α4*Xi;t−1*ISL
þ α5*Xi;t−1*ISL*P2þ α6*Xi;t−1*ISL*P3þ α5*Ci;t þ εi; j;t ð4Þ
with the dependent variable being the first difference of the log of deposits of bank
type j for bank i during period t. The right-hand side variables include the same bank
fundamentals (X) and bank controls (C) as in the previous (sub)sections. While the
period before the 2001Q1 crisis serves as a reference period, we define P2 as equal to
1 for the period 2001Q1-2005Q3 and 0 otherwise, P3 is equal to 1 for the period
2005Q4 to 2012Q4 and 0 otherwise. The differences in deposit flow sensitivities to
bank risk across the two depositor groups and the three periods are summarized as
follows:
Conventional Banks Islamic Banks
Period 1 (1998Q1-2000Q4) α1 α1 +α4
Period 2 (2001Q1-2005Q3) α1 +α2 (α1 +α4) + (α2 +α5)
Period 3 (2005Q4-2012Q4) α1 +α3 (α1 +α4) + (α3 +α6)
The estimation results are reported in Table 5. As in the previous tables, the
different columns represent different sample compositions.21 Prior to the crisis, in
Period 1, we observe a positive relationship between deposit flows and bank capital
for both modes of banking, and in fact no difference in market disciplining between
them (the coefficient α1 of CAP is positive, whereas the coefficient α4 of the
19 We refer to Cubillas et al. (2012) and Berger and Turk-Ariss (2014) for evidence about the weakening impact
of government intervention on market discipline.
20 Likewise no bank panic occurred when banking regulators took over management of Bank Asya in February
2015.
21 In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results, we only report the coefficient estimates of CAP and its
interactions with ISL and/or time frame dummies (Period 2 and Period 3) since the other fundamental variables
do not allow us to draw clear conclusions concerning their influence on market discipline.
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Table 5 Crisis, deposit insurance reform, and the sensitivity of deposits to bank capitalization. This table reports
estimates in the time dimension covering 1998Q1-2012Q4. The dependent variable is DEPG, which is calculated
as the first difference of the log of deposits. The bank fundamentals are represented by CAP, NPL, and LIQ. The
CAP is the book value of equity to total assets. The LIQ is equal to liquid assets (cash and central bank reserves)
to total assets. The NPL is ratio of loans under follow-up to total credits. Although we estimate the most flexible
specification by integrating each of these fundamentals directly (coefficient α1 in Eq. 3) as well as with three
separate interaction terms (coefficients α2, α3 and α4 in Eq. 3), we only report CAP and its interactions to
facilitate the interpretation of results. ISL is equal to 1 for Islamic banks, and 0 otherwise. While the period before
the 2001Q1 crisis serve as a reference period, we define PERIOD2 as equal to 1 for the period 2001Q1-2005Q3
and 0 otherwise, and PERIOD3 as equal to 1 for the period 2005Q4 to 2012Q4 and 0 otherwise. The control-
vector contains Bank size, Bank age, Branch size and Listed. The Bank size variable is computed as the natural
logarithm of total assets. The Bank age variable is the natural logarithm of quarter-years the bank exists. The
Branch size variable is the average number of employees per branch . The Listed variable equals to 1 when banks
are listed in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (Borsa Istanbul). Bank-type (Islamic or conventional) quarter-year
dummy variables are included in all specifications but their coefficient estimates are not reported. The regression
method is fixed effect estimator with heteroskedasticity and within-panel serial correlation robust standard errors.
Standard errors in parentheses
VARIABLES Deposit growth (sample period 1998Q1-2012Q4)
1 2 3 4
CAP 1.27116*** 1.33225*** 2.09319*** 1.14524***
(0.2197) (0.2275) (0.4206) (0.1800)
CAP x PERIOD2 −0.30974 −0.36737 −0.83291* −0.48461**
(0.2345) (0.2517) (0.4714) (0.2315)
CAP x PERIOD3 −0.61155*** −0.64632*** −1.25641*** −0.45183
(0.1845) (0.1935) (0.2983) (0.4619)
CAP x ISL 0.81389 0.75626 0.36319 0.19130
(0.6856) (0.6860) (0.9266) (0.4674)
CAP x ISL x PERIOD2 −2.07830*** −2.02474*** −2.06266* −1.14886**
(0.6804) (0.7011) (1.0793) (0.4330)
CAP x ISL x PERIOD3 −1.14456 −1.11038 −1.46762 −0.55153
(0.9447) (0.9718) (1.3620) (0.6623)
Bank controls
Bank size 0.20401*** 0.20952*** 0.29293*** 0.10146***
(0.0363) (0.0383) (0.0693) (0.0274)
Bank age −0.17262*** −0.18201*** −0.19773** −0.15202***
(0.0491) (0.0512) (0.0948) (0.0361)
Branch size −0.00225* −0.00225* −0.00302** 0.00305
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0020)
Listed −0.05325 −0.05393* 0.01587 0.01376
(0.0373) (0.0319) (0.0322) (0.0256)
State-owned banks Yes ----- ----- -----
Private-owned banks Yes Yes ----- Yes
Foreign-owned banks Yes Yes Yes -----
Islamic banks Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,361 2,170 1,125 1,292
R-squared 0.1157 0.1188 0.1599 0.4270
Statistical significance is indicated by *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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interaction term CAP x ISL is non-significant). In the post-crisis period, in Period 2,
conventional depositors kept disciplining their banks (α1 +α2, i.e., the sum of the
coefficients of CAP and CAP x P2, respectively, is positive for all different sample
compositions). Results for Islamic depositors, however, indicate that the capital ratio
had not an effect on the direction of deposit flows in a way that market discipline
operates. In the post-deposit insurance reform period, in Period 3, the sensitivity of
conventional deposits to bank capitalization is positive. More importantly, it seems
that the unification of the deposit insurance schemes has restored market discipline of
Islamic depositors (sum of the coefficients (α1 +α4) and (α3 +α6) is positive and
statistically significant for all sample compositions), confirming our previous findings.
In the full sample estimation (1998Q1-2012Q4), we, in fact, show that sensitivity of
deposit flows to bank capitalization between Islamic and conventional depositors is
only different in the period when Islamic banks had to operate under an Islamic
deposit insurance scheme. This finding implies that the control group of conventional
banks constitutes a valid counterfactual, which is in support for the difference-in-
differences estimator used in this study.
7 Discussion and concluding remarks
Our results reveal that, with the introduction of an Islamic deposit insurance scheme,
Islamic bank depositors did behave differently than their conventional counterparts and
that these differences are substantial. More specifically, in the period when Islamic deposit
insurance was introduced, and compared with their conventional peers, we consistently
observe that the sensitivity of Islamic depositors to bank risk was annihilated. More
specifically, we do not observe risk aversion of Islamic depositors as they do not exhibit
behavior that is consistent with both quantity and price-based disciplining. At first glance,
our results might seem puzzling why Islamic depositor reactions are different from their
conventional peers, and subsequently switch decisions with the unification of the deposit
insurance. However, this is less so if we take into account the very nature of the deposit
insurance reform. This finding is likely due to the specific design of the Islamic deposit
insurance scheme that was created immediately after the crisis. This scheme was admin-
istered by the ‘Union of Private Finance Houses’, consisting of only a handful of Islamic
banks. The Union was empowered to act as the resolution authority for non-viable banks,
and was charged to promote sound risk management practices over its members. The
Islamic deposit insurance fund was interest free and Sharia compliant, and once the
license of an Islamic bank was revoked, the liquidation had to be executed by the
Union, and the insured deposits had to be settled by the Islamic insurance fund.
Furthermore, the Union was mandated to detect early warning signals so that it could
intervene timely in the resolution of troubled banks. By remaining silent, Islamic depos-
itors may have delegated their monitoring responsibility to this Union. It can be argued
that the replacement of market supervision by mutual supervision among member banks
may be simply a consequence of rational behavior. Particularly, the stakes of Islamic
banks were large in case of a failure since the scheme was backed by them, and the
limited number of banks was conducive to robust oversight.
J Financ Serv Res (2017) 51:257–282 279
Conversely, in the post-reform period, we observe that Islamic depositors have started to
discipline their banks. In other words, if the bank fundamentals turn out to be weak,
depositors indeed want to exercise power over bank management by withdrawing their
funds. One explanation for this behavioral shift is that depositors may have started to
hesitate about the Shariah-compliance of the deposit insurance under SDIF protection. This
is a viable argument since the purpose of a separate Islamic deposit insurance scheme,
which avoided the use of premiums paid by conventional banks, was to signal a radical
break from the conventional banking system in order to soothe the sensitivities of the
religiously inspired depositors. Hence, in Turkey, the Islamic deposit insurance allowed
Islamic banks to give more security to their depositors, while keeping their operations
ostensibly interest-free (El-Gamal and Inanoglu 2000).
The Islamic deposit insurance was instituted as a response to the failure of Ihlas Finans in
2001. By expanding the temporal scope of our analysis, i.e., including the time period before
the 2001 financial crisis, we confirm our findings that depositors’ sensitivity to the Islamic
banks’ capitalization was substantially muted with the introduction of an Islamic deposit
insurance scheme.
We also can state that the risk aversion of depositors is contingent on the Shariah-
compliance of Islamic banking. If depositors become suspicious about the operating environ-
ment of banks, they become more vigilant and pay greater attention to bank risk. This intuition
suggests that the degree of risk aversion depends on the religious commitment of Islamic
banks. In environments where the commitment is high, loyalty may win over risk aversion
(and vice versa). Since the new deposit insurance lacks religious quality, Islamic depositors
show a greater tendency to discipline their banks (risk aversion). From a regulatory point of
view, perhaps unintentionally, the reform has increased market discipline among Islamic
depositors, which has reinforced the first line of defense for a safe and sound banking system.
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